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CLASSIFICATION OF INCORPOREAL MOVABLES
The classification of property belonging to married persons as
either community or separate' is basic to a determination of a
number of issues2 which are important not only to the spouses,' but
also to their heirs,' their creditors,, and other third parties who deal
with the spouses. One category of assets, incorporeal movables,'
historically has been particularly difficult to classify. The new
matrimonial regimes legislation,7 while making some changes in the
classification articles, does little to alleviate that difficulty. At the
same time, a number of new questions have arisen concerning the
classification of incorporeal movables because the new articles are
subject to varying interpretations.
History and Background
Louisiana and other community property jurisdictions have
traditionally' classified property as community or separate, using
two factors: time' and manner" of acquisition. The former Code ar.
ticles on classifying property expressly covered most of the ways in
which property could be acquired: through labor and industry,"
1. LA. CIv. COD:; art. 2335.
2. For example, the classification determines, in part, who will receive the pro-
perty upon termination of the community or marriage. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2356.
3. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2346-2355. For a particularly insightful discussion, see.
Note, Termination of the Community, 42 LA. L. REV. 789 (1982).
4. See. e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 915, 916 & 916.1.
5. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2359. 2360, 2363 & 3183.
6. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 473 (definition of incorporeal movable).
7. 1979 La. Acts., No. 709 (effective January 1, 1980).
8. The precise origins of the concepts of community property are not known. W.
DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 7 (2d ed. 1971). Loui-
siana's community property principles, however, clearly were derived from Spanish
law. Comment, Origin and Historical Development of the Community Property
System, 25 LA. L. REv. 78, 91-93 (1964).
9. G. McKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 198 (2d ed.
1925).
10. The manner of acquisition under Spanish law might be onerous (giving money
or labor for property) or lucrative (receiving a gift or inheritance). If acquired during a
marriage, an onerous acquisition was generally classified as community property. A
lucrative donation made during marriage was separate property, unless the donor in-
tended it to be a gift to both spouses. 1 W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PRO-
PERTY § 62 (1943). This distinction is incorporated into Civil Code article 2343.1, added
by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
11. LA. Civ. CODI arts. 2334 & 2402 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2338.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
through purchases, 2 through donations and inheritances, 3 through
accession,"' and through tort suits. 5 But those articles did not ex-
pressly define the time of acquisition. Generally, the reference to
time was simply noted as "during the marriage," "upon dissolution
of the marriage," or when "brought into the marriage.""
Because the Code articles did not define the time of acquisition, 7
the courts have adopted three theories which aid in classifying in-
corporeal movables by determining the time of acquisition: inception
of title, vesting, and pro rata.'8 Inception of title "focuses on the in-
itiation of the transaction."'9 If, for example, the court used the in-
ception of title theory to classify a pension plan, the time of acquisi-
tion would be the date on which the employee joined the pension
plan. If the employee was single when he joined the plan, the pen-
sion rights would be separate property and remain separate property
even if he later married. If he were married when he joined the
plan, the pension rights would be community property even if he
later divorced. With the vesting approach, "the focus is on the closing
of the transaction."' Using the example above, the time of acquis-
ition would be the date on which the employee is granted the right
to receive a pension benefit. Thus, if the plan vested while the
employee were single, his rights in the plan would be separate property;
if it vested while he were married, the rights in the pension plan
would be community property. The pro rata approach focuses "on
the overall percent of consideration paid over time by the community
and by a spouse separately," and it provides for "concurrent owner-
12. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2334 & 2402 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 (amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1).
13. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2334 & 2402 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 (amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1).
14. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2386 & 2402 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2339.
15. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2334 & 2402 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344.
16. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2334, 2402 & 2406 (as they appeared prior to their repeal
by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). Cf. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 (amended by 1981
La. Acts, No. 921, § 1).
17. The absence of such a definition is troublesome where annuities, pensions, in-
surance, payment of damages, and similar property rights are acquired over a period
of time. During that period, a person might begin unmarried, marry, dissolve the mar-
riage, and remarry.
18. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 220-21
(1975).
19. Id. at 220.
20. Id. at 220-21.
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ship by commun:ity and separate estates."'" In the pension plan ex-
ample, the time of acquisition would continue over a period of time
beginning with the initial joining of the plan and ending when
employment stopped. If the employee were to join the plan as a
single person, continue participating during marriage, and dissolve
the marriage while continuing to participate in the plan, the rights
to pension benefits would be prorated between his separate estate
and the community. Thus, depending on which theory was used to
determine the time of acquisition, an incorporeal movable might be
classified as totally separate property, totally community property,
or partially separate and partially community property."
Manner of Acquisition Under the New Code Articles
In some cases the manner of acquisition is often a more impor-
tant factor than the time of acquisition. For example, inheritances,
donations, and damages awarded in certain suits are classified
according to the manner in which they are acquired. When property
is received "by inheritance or donation to him individually," article
2341 requires that it be classified as the separate property of the
heir, 3 regardless of the marital status of the heir when the in-
heritance is received.
21. Id at 221. SEe, e.g., T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La.
1976).
22. In Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981), the court stated that "[w]hile
other community property states may categorize property paid for in part with
separate funds and ir part with community funds as mixed, Louisiana does not do so.
Under our law property is characterized as either community or separate." Id at
57. This statement iN misleading. Technically, it is correct to say that neither the
legislation nor the ccurts use the label "mixed" to describe a property classification
(although one court has described its disposition in a partition case as a divison of "mixed"
property. Lane v. Larie, 375 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 381 So. 2d
1222 (La. 1980)). The court's statement in Curtis implies, however, that a pro rata
classification never is allowed under Louisiana law, an implication which plainly is er-
roneous; the legislation has not prohibited the use of a pro rata scheme. Indeed, the
Louisiana Supreme Court itself applied the pro rata method in a number of cases. See,
e.g., Sims v. Sims, 3581 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977); T.L.
James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d
242 (La. 1975). The court also has prorated funds deposited in bank accounts. Succes-
sion of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947). See also Stoutz v. United States, 324 F.
Supp. 197, 203 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1971) (separate funds
deposited in an account with community funds retained their separate character);
Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956) (dicta); Gregory v. Gregory, 233
So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (dicta); Succession of Sonnier, 208 So. 2d 562 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1968) (dicta). In these cases, the courts' reasoning leads to the conclusion
that things paid for cut of both community and separate funds could be prorated.
23. "The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: . . . pro.
perty acquired by a spouse by inheritance." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341, as amended by




Donations generally are classified by examining the donor's in-
tent. Donations made in authentic acts usually name the donee or
donees. If only one spouse is named, the property given will be
classified as the separate property of that spouse.2' If both spouses
are named, the donation will be classified as community property. 5
But in donations made by manual delivery, the donor's intent to
make the gift separate or community must be established before the
property can be classified. 8 If the donor's intent cannot be determined,
the gift will be presumed to be community property under article
2340.27 If the gift is a remunerative donation,"8 however, it will not
be classified according to these rules. Instead, the property will be
classified as property acquired through effort, skill or industry
under article 2338.29 Likewise, if the gift is an onerous donation,' it
will be classified under articles 2338 and 2341."
Special rules apply to donations by one spouse to the other
spouse22 Article 2343 provides that when one spouse gives his in-
24. See LA. CIv. CODE 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1: "The
separate property of a spouse ... comprises ... property acquired by a spouse by...
donation to him individually."
25. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338. "The community property comprises ... property
donated to the spouse jointly."
26. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 as amended by 1981 La, Acts, No. 921, §
1).
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2340 states: "Things in the possession of a spouse during
the existence of a regime of community of acquets and gains are presumed to be com-
munity .. " See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 381 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (wed-
ding shower gifts are presumed to be gifts to both the husband and the wife in the
absence of proof that they were given to only one spouse).
28. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1523, 1525, & 1526.
29. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338, which states: "The community property com-
prises: property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort.
skill, or industry of either spouse .. " W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 10, at § 69.
30. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1523, 1524, & 1526.
31. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, §
1). See also notes 24 & 25, supra, and text at notes 100-102, infra.
32. See LA CIv. CODE art. 2343. as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, which
states:
The donation by a spouse to the other spouse of his undivided interest in a
thing forming part of the community transforms that interest into separate pro-
perty of the donee. Unless otherwise provided in the act of donation, an equal in-
terest of the donee is also transformed into separate property and the natural and
civil fruits of the thing, and minerals produced from or attributable to the property
given as well as bonuses, delay rentals, royalties and shut-in payments arising
from mineral leases, form part of the donee's separate property.
See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343.1, added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, which states:
The transfer by a spouse to the other spouse of a thing forming part of his
19821
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terest in community property to the other, that interest becomes
the separate property of the donee. Furthermore, the donee's in-
terest in the community property also becomes separate property,
unless the act of donation states otherwise.3 For example, if a com-
munity includes 1000 shares of stock, and the husband gives his in-
terest in the stock to his wife, she becomes the sole owner of the en-
tire 1000 shares of stock.
The act of donation, however, could provide that the donee's in-
terest in the community property remain as community property. In
that case, the wife would be the sole owner of a one-half undivided
interest in the stock, and the other one-half undivided interest
would be community property. A question arises as to how the one-
half undivided community interest is to be treated in a voluntary or
judicial partition. Article 2336 states that "[e]ach spouse owns a pre-
sent undivided one-half interest in the community property."3 Two
possible interpretations result from a reading of articles 2343 and
2336. First, if the husband gives his interest to the wife, then the
one-half interest that remains in the community must be the wife's
one-half undivided interest in the community. This result is an-
alogous to situations in which the donor and the donee are not.
spouses but own property as co-owners. 5 Under this interpretation,
when the property is partitioned, the wife alone would have a claim
to that one-half undivided community interest. She would get 500
shares of community-owned stock and 500 shares of separate stock.
The second possible intepretation is that whatever remains in the
community is subject to claims of ownership by both spouses, even
though one spouse has given his undivided interest to the other
spouse. Thus, the husband would still have an undivided interest in
the shares of stock that remained community property after he
made his gift. Upon partition, the husband and wife would each get
250 shares of community stock, and the wife would also keep her 500
shares of stock received as a gift from her husband. The first inter-
pretation seems to be the better view because it is more consistent
with principles of property owned in indivision.
Where one spouse donates community property to the other, a
separate property, with the stipulation that it shall be part of the community,
transforms the thing into community property. As to both movables and im-
movables, a transfer by onerous title must be made in writing and a transfer by
gratuitous title must be made by authentic act.
33. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts. No. 921, § 1. This article
may not require an authentic act, whereas Civil Code article 2343.1 does require an
authentic act.
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
35. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 477 & 480.
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question arises as to how to classify the fruits of that property. The
general rule of article 2339 is that the fruits of separate or community
property are considered community property unless a declaration is
filed for registry declaring them to be separate2 But when com-
munity property is donated by one spouse to the other, the opposite
classification is assigned23 Under article 2343, the fruits will be
classified as separate unless the donor spouse stipulates in the act of
donation that they will continue to be community property." In the
stock gift example, the dividends received after the donation would
be the separate property of the wife, unless the husband had stip-
ulated otherwise. Had he stipulated that the dividends were to be
community property, upon partition the husband would be entitled to
one-half of the dividends received. Another possible disposition
would be that the husband could give his one-half undivided interest
in the stock to his wife, stipulate that her interest remain community
property, and make no provisions in the act concerning the divi-
dends. Upon partition, he would have a claim to one-half of the
dividends on the community-owned stock, and the wife would have a
claim to one-half the dividends on the community stock plus all of
the dividends on her separate stock.
Different provisions apply to donations of separate property.
Under article 2343.1, added in 1981, when a spouse transfers by
onerous or gratuitous title his separate property to the other spouse
and stipulates that the property is to be part of the community, the
36. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2339 states:
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals pro-
duced from or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals,
royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases are community pro-
perty. Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as his separate property by a
declaration made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly
acknowledged [by the spouse].
37. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343, comment (b), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No.
921, § 1. The reason for departing from the provisions of article 2339, as suggested by
one writer, was to allow more favorable treatment of donations in computing federal
estate taxes. Riley, Analysis of the 1980 Revision of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of
Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. REv. 453, 483 (1980).
38. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1. A literal
reading of the article indicates that the donor could stipulate any disposition he chose
for his share of the fruits. Thus, he might not be confined to stipulating that his in-
terest in the fruits were for the community, but might stipulate that the fruits were to
inure to a third person's benefit. This reasoning is inconsistent with the pervasive
preference for the community shown throughout the Code articles governing
matrimonial regimes. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE art. 2340. A more reasonable interpreta-
tion is that the donor spouse's only alternative to donating the fruits to the other
spouse's separate estate is to reserve them for the community.
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property will be community property." Thus, if a husband donates
his separately owned stock to the community, the stock is owned in
indivision by both the husband and the wife. If, however, the gift of
separate property -is made to the other spouse without the stipula-
tion that it will belong to the community, the legislation implies that
the property will be classified as the separate property of the donee
spouse."0 This result would be consistent with the general rule in ar-
ticle 2341 that a donation made to a spouse individually is separate
property,' and by analogy, consistent with the general rule in article
2343 that a spouse's gift of community property also becomes the
separate property of the recipient spouse.'"
Because article 2343.1 does not explain how the fruits of
separate property donated to a community are to be treated, two in-
terpretations are possible. First, a reading of the article in pari
materia with article 2343 suggests that the fruits would be classified as
the property itself is classified. Thus, if the property is donated to the
community, the fruits will fall into the community, and if the proper-
ty is considered donated to the other spouse's separate estate
(because no stipulation in favor of the community was made), the
fruits will fall into the spouse's separate estate.'3 The second inter-
pretation is that the legislature, in failing to specify how to classify
the fruits, may have intended that article 2343.1 was not to be read
with article 2343, but instead with articles 2338 and 2339. Under this
analysis, by applying article 2338" the fruits of property donated to
the community would be community property. And under article
2339, even fruits produced from property donated to the other
spouse's estate would be community unless a declaration reserving
the fruits as separate property had been filed.'5 Thus, under both
analyses, fruits of property donated to the community will be com-
munity. But fruits of separate property donated to the other spouse's
separate estate -might be community or separate, depending on
which articles the legislature intended to apply in inter'preting arti-
cle 2343.1. One indication that the legislature intended that articles
2338 and 2339 should control the classification of fruits under article
2343.1 is that the article covers not only donated property but also
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343.1. added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1. See note 28,
8upra.
40. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343.1. added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
41. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
42. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
43. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
44. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338.
45. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2339.
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property transferred by onerous title."6 Article 2343 contemplates
only donated property,'" whereas article 2338 and 2339 encompass
all manners of acquisition of property. 8 To extend article 2343's pro-
visions to property given under onerous title could be going beyond
the bounds set by the legislature.
Another problem arises in classifying fruits under article 2343.1
when the spouse reserved the fruits of the separate property'9 prior
to making the gift or transferring the property under onerous title.
The legislature probably intended that when separate property is
conveyed to the community or to the other spouse's estate, any
declaration of reservation of fruits automatically would become null.
Article 2339 allows the reservation of fruits for a spouse's estate only
when the fruits are derived from that spouse's separate property."
Article 2338 does not allow fruits to be reserved when they are
derived from community property.5 ' Therefore, when the separate
property of the donor becomes either the separate property of the
donee or community property, the declaration should cease to have
any effect.
The legislature should re-examine the Code articles on donations
from one spouse to another and give special, attention to these
issues: (1) whether a donor spouse under article 23432 should be per-
mitted to stipulate in the act of donation that the donee's interest
shall remain community property, (2) what the proper treatment of
such an undivided community interest would be in a partition, and
(3) whether article 2343.1 should be amended to provide for the filing
of a declaration of reservation of fruits.53
Classifying Damages Under Article 2341
Like donations, certain damages are classified on the basis of
the manner of acquisition. Article 2341 characterizes damages
awarded to one spouse as separate property when the action is against
the other spouse for breach of contract or for "fraud or bad faith" in
managing the community property."' By implication, that article
46. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343.1, added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
47. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
48. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2338 & 2339.
49. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2339.
50. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2339.
51. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
52. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
53. Compare LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343.1, added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921. § 1, with
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921 § 1.
54. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § I states that
separate property includes "damages awarded to a spouse in an action for breach of
contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad
faith in the management of community property by the other spouse ... "
I
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would also require causes of action for breach of contract or fraud or
bad faith in community property management by one spouse to be
the separate property of the injured spouse.55 For example, a wife,
extremely angry with her husband, seeks to make him more irate by
investing a large sum of community funds in her brother's failing
business. She knows that the invested funds will be lost and that
her husband would not want the funds invested in a losing venture.
The husband may have a separate cause of action against the wife
for bad faith in managing the community assets. Any damages
awarded in the suit against her will become his separate property.
Likewise, where a husband agrees to give up smoking in exchange
for his wife's promise to paint a portrait of his mother, and he
breaches his promise while she keeps hers, she might have a sepa-
rate cause of action against him for breach of contract. Damages
awarded to her for the breach would be her separate property.
Actions and damages for tort suits other than those for fraud or
bad faith in managing community assets are treated differently.
First, neither article 2344, 2338, nor 2341 mentions the possibility of
other tort actions between spouses.58 The implication is that the
general interspousal immunity from tort suits is continued.57 In suits
against third parties for damage to property, the damages received
become separate property if the injured or lost property was sepa-
rately owned;58 if the injured or lost property was a community
thing, the damages become community assets. 9 The implication is
that the causes of action will be classified in the same fashion as the
damages."'
Classifying Property Received in a Partition
The final type of property that is classified chiefly by looking at
the manner in which it is acquired is property received by a spouse
55. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has found that one spouse may have an interest in damages
awarded in a cause of action which could only be brought by the other spouse. See
Chambers v. Chambers, 219 So. 2d 896 (La. 1971), overruled on other grounds, West v.
Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). See also text at pages 65-81, infra; Note,
Management of Community Assets, 42 LA. L. REV. 770 (1982).
56. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338, 2341 (amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1) &
2344.
57. See LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960 & 1979). But see LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950 & Supp.
1958 & 1962) (permitting a direct action by a spouse against the other spouse's
insurer).
58. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1: Separate
property includes "damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection
with the management of his separate property."
59. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338. Community property includes "damages awarded for
loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community."
60. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341 (amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1).
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in a voluntary partition of the community. Article 2336 was amended
in 1981 to permit voluntary partial or whole partitions of the com-
munity during marriage without court approval."1 At the same time,
article 2341 was amended to classify the property partitioned as the
separate. property of the spouse who acquired it under the partition
agreement."2 The fruits accruing on partitioned property after the
date of partition should become community property unless declared
to be the separate property of the acquiring spouse in a declaration
filed for registry." Thus, where a community interest in oil produc-
tion is partitioned, each spouse would receive a one-half interest as
sole owner; but absent a declaration, the royalties received from
each interest would fall into the community.
Time of Acquisition Under the New Code Articles
Classifications based on the time of acquisition are characterized
by the language "property acquired during" the existence of the
regime or "property acquired . . . prior to marriage."'" The deter-
mination of what event constitutes an acquisition is problematic.
The legislation may require that one particular theory be applied to
determine the time of acquisition of property in specific situations;
in other situations, the legislation may permit the court to apply its
choice of theories to determine the time of acquisition. The question
arises in several Code articles.
Classifying Damages Under Article 2344
The first is article 2344 which classifies damages for personal in-
juries "sustained during the existence of the marriage."'" Such
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, now states
in part: "During the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may,
without court approval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or in
part. In such a case, the things that each spouse acquires are separate property."
62. Civil Code article 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, now
classifies as separate property "things acquired by a spouse as a result of a voluntary
partition of the community during the existence of a community property regime."
63. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2339 & 2336, comment (a) (amended by 1981 La. Acts,
No. 921, § 1).
64. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338, 2341 (amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, §
1) & 2344.
65. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344:
Damages due to personal injuries sustained during the existence of the com-
munity by a spouse are separate property. •
Nevertheless, the portion of the damages attributable to expenses incurred by
the community as a result of injury, or in compensation of the loss of community
earnings, is community property. If the community regime is terminated other-
wise than by the death of the injured spouse, the portion of the damages at-
tributable to the loss of earnings that would have accrued after termination of the
community property regime is the separate property of the injured spouse.
19821
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damages are separate property, with the exception of two items
which are community property: damages awarded for "expenses in-
curred by the community as a result of the injury" and in "compen-
sation of the loss of community earnings.""6 When the injury occurs
during the marriage and the marriage is later dissolved, article 2344
mandates that damages for lost earnings of the injured spouse be
prorated" between the community and his separate estate. 8 Thus, in
every award of damages for personal injuries suffered during a com-
munity property regime, the injured spouse's separate estate will
receive the total amount of the damages less community expenses
and community lost earnings. Protection of widows and widowers is
granted through the article's exemption from proration when the in-
jured spouse dies."' In this situation, comment (b) to article 2344
states that the entire amount of lost earnings would fall into the
community. 70
While article 2344 specifically provides for classifying damages
that result from personal injuries sustained during marriage, it does
not specify the classification of damages when the injury is sustained
prior to marriage. Presumably, the damages would be classified as
separate property acquired prior to marriage under article 2341."'
But if no marriage takes place until after the damages are awarded,
a question arises as to whether community expenses or loss of earn-
ings as a result of the injury would compel the reclassification of a
portion of the damages as community property. Article 2344 seems
to contemplate that the expenses must be incurred by a community
prior to the awarding of damages. The article's language, "the portion
of the damages attributable to expenses incurred by the community
66. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
67. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
68. Thus, the court's reasoning in West v. Ortego has been legislatively approved.
See West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). In West, the husband's injury occurred
during the marriage. He began receiving worker's compensation benefits shortly after
the wife filed for judicial separation. The court rejected her claim that all of the
benefits he received would be community property because the cause of action arose
during the community regime. Instead, the court found that the situation presented by
these facts was one not contemplated in the Code. The court then resorted to its
power under Civil Code article 21 to craft an equitable solution. That solution was to
award the wife one-half of the benefits accruing to the community between the time of
injury and the date of filing for judicial separation. The remainder of the benefits fell
into the husband's separate estate. Id at 248-49. According to Professor Spaht, Civil
Code article 2344 is "modeled after the pro rata rule in West v. Ortego." Spaht, In-
terim Study Year, 39 LA. L. REV. 551. 553 n.5 (1979). The legislative approval of the
reasoning, however, may not necessarily extend to the holding in West. See note 80,
infra, and accompanying text.
69. Samuel, The Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's Equal Management Law:
Interpretation and Constitutionality, 39 LA. L. REv. 347, 394 n.201 (1979).
70. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344, comment (b).
71. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341.
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as a result of the injury, or in compensation of the loss of community
earnings, is community property,"7 suggests that the property is to
be classified at the time the damages are awarded. In other words,
the inception of title approach would be applied to classify damages
for injuries sustained prior to marriage. Under this analysis, a
future community would not be entitled to claim any part of the
damages that are awarded as a result of injuries that occur prior to
marriage. However, the legislature may not have have intended
such a distinction when it drafted the article. "[T]he portion of
damages attributable to expenses incurred by the community as a
result of the injury, or [compensation for lost earnings]" may be
read independently of the article's first sentence reference to "during
the existence of the regime."" Under the pro rata theory, a future
community might be apportioned a part of the damages awarded to
an unmarried person. The better interpretation is that the
legislature intended that the inception of title theory be applied
whenever the damages are awarded for an injury sustained prior to
marriage."
Presumably, the courts will use formulas similar to those it has
used in cases decided under the old law when applying the pro rata
theory."5 Nevertheless, two problems will persist. First is the prob-
lem of how to account for the fact that wages normally increase
with age. The second is how to account for inflationary increases."6
These provisions of article 2344 regarding damages raise the
question of how to classify causes of action in which those damages
are sought. Article 2344 does not classify specifically the causes of
action that might arise as a result of personal injuries that occur
during the marriage, but the implication is that a cause of action
will be classified in the same manner as the damages that are
sought." Thus, if a husband is injured during the marriage, he has a
72. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
73. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344.
74. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the cases decided under the
old legislation classified damages for injuries sustained prior to marriage as separate
property. See, e.g., Broussard v. Broussard, 390 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1976). The legislature
could have overruled this case law by expressly providing for proration of damages
when the injury occurred prior to marriage. Its failure to specifically address this pro-
blem in article 2344 suggests that such damages are to be separate property under article
2341.
75. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 349 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (trial
court's formula used to account for life expectancy of the injured spouse might be ap-
plied to lost earnings).
76. See Curtis v. Curtis, 388 So. 2d 816, 817 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981) (prorating the appreciated value of a house be-
tween the community and the wife's separate estate).
77. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
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separate cause of action for pain and suffering, because any
damages that might be awarded for pain and suffering would be his
separate property. He or his wife would have a community cause of
action for damages in compensation for lost community earnings
because such damages would fall into the community. But the wife
could not bring suit for the pain and suffering of the husband."
If article 2344 does govern the classification of causes of action
for personal injuries, one issue is whether it includes all causes of
action and claims that may arise from a personal injury. For exam-
ple, comment (a) to article 2344 states that this article will apply to
worker's compensation." The article is based on the reasoning of the
court in West v. Ortego,0 where worker's compensation benefits
were at issue. This adoption of the West reasoning in article 2344
would support a conclusion that worker's compensation benefits
should be classified under article 2344. Nevertheless, the article
itself does not expressly include worker's compensation, which may
be taken as indicative of the legislature's intent that worker's com-
pensation not be included within the provisions of article 2344. If
worker's compensation benefits are included, there is a strong argu-
ment that disability payments from private insurers should also be
subject to the pro rata requirements of article 2344, instead of being
classified under the vesting theory.8 The only distinction between
78. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344. But see LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
79. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344, comment (a).
80. See note 68, supra.
81. See Lacaze v. Tennessee Life Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 349 So. 2d 1267 (La. 1977). In Lacaze, the court used a vesting theory to find
that a husband's right to receive disability payments from his employer-sponsored in-
surance policy had arisen at the time that he was no longer able to work. In a concur-
ring opinion Judge Watson (now Justice Watson) stated: "ITjhe decisive factor is not
the time when the premiums were paid but the date rights vested under the policy....
[H]is rights . . . vested ... when he was unable to continue working." Id. at 1282 (em-
phasis added). Because the wife filed for separation before the husband stopped work-
ing, the court found that the benefits were his separate property. Here, the husband
had joined the employer plan during the marriage, his illness has originated during the
marriage, and premiums paid by the husband presumably were from community funds.
The court distinguished these facts from other cases in which employer compensation
had been classified on a pro rata basis, e.g.. Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1975), because it found the analogy to insurance cases more appropriate.
Judge Watson stated: "[T]hese payments are made to Lacaze only because of his cur-
rent inability to work and do not represent any compensation for disability during the
period of his marriage." Id. at 1282. Under the court's vesting approach, had the hus-
band in Lacaze been unable to continue working prior to the dissolution of the mar-
riage, all of the benefits would have fallen into the community. See Hall v. Hall, 349
-So. 2d 1349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). The court probably chose not to use the inception
of title approach, as it generally does in insurance cases, because that would have
resulted in classifying the benefits as community property in their entirety. See Hall
v. Hall, 349 So. 2d 1349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), in which the fourth circuit held that
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worker's compensation and private insurance disability payments is
the source of the payments. On one hand, the employer or his in-
surer pays; on the other hand, the employee through his insurer
pays. The manner of acquisition is essentially the same; therefore,
the theory used to classify the acquisition should be the same.
Classifying Commingled Property
The question of which theory to use also arises in situations
covered by articles 2338 and 2341 where separate and community
things are commingled in an acquisition of property.82 When the
funds or things that are commingled cannot be satisfactorily traced
to their original nature as separate or community, obviously no com-
parison of their values can be made. Since no comparison of values
can be made, the property acquired with those things cannot be
classified under article 2341.3 The property acquired, then, must be
classified under article 2338; the entire property will be community
property."
When both community and separate things are given in payment
and their character and values can be established, article 2341 is the
first step in determining the character of the property received in
the exchange. Article 2341 states that separate property includes
*property acquired by a spouse with . . . separate and community
things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in
comparison with the value of the separate things used."85 When applied
former article 2334 did not permit a pro rata classification "where both the cause of ac-
tion and the recovery of damages occurred during the existence of the community." Id.
at 1352. Perhaps the legislature intended in new article 2344 merely to correct an ine-
quity which was produced in the Hall case. If so, the legislature may have intended
that the new article cover only causes of action for damages and that it exclude other
causes of action, such as worker's compensation and other recoveries, such as disability
insurance.
82. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341.
83. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341.
84. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2338 states that "[Clommunity property comprises ... pro-
perty acquired with . . . community and separate things, unless classified as separate
property under article 2341." (Emphasis added). The italicized clause creates a residual
class in that whatever cannot be classified under article 2341's commingling clause falls
under the commingling clause of article 2338 quoted above.
85. LA. CIv. CODE: art. 2341. The language requiring a comparison apparently is
taken from a line of cases on commingling of funds in bank accounts.
When separate funds are mixed or co-mingled with community funds to the ex-
tent that the separate funds are no longer capable of identification, and it is im-
possible to establish what part of the funds belongs either to the separate estate
or to the community, then all of said funds are regarded as belonging to the com-
munity. If only a relatively small amount of community funds are co-mingled with
separate funds, then the mixing of such funds will be considered as inconsequen-
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to the cash purchase of an incorporeal movable such as a bond, the
literal language of the article suggests that only the inception of title
theory may be applied. Thus, if a husband took $800 of his separate
funds and $10 of community funds and paid the $810 as the full pur-
chase price of the bond on January 1, the time of acquisition would
be that day, January 1. Using an inception of title approach, the
bond would be classified as his separate property because the $10 of
community funds used are inconsequential in comparison with the
$800 of separate funds used.
Comment (b) to article 2341 suggests that the comparison of'
values may not be necessary in all cases of commingling, but may in-
stead be required only "at the time of acquisition."88 If the "time of
acquisition" is read to mean the moment when all obligations are
completely performed, then the comparison of values may be re-
quired only for cash purchases or exchanges in which no suspensive
conditions or conjunctive obligations remain to be performed. This
interpretation thus leaves the courts with latitude to apply the pro
rata approach to acquisitions acquired over a period of time. If,
however, the "time of acquisiton" referred to in comment (b) does
not limit the application of this clause to the time when the transac-
tion is completed (ie., no suspensive conditions or conjunctive
obligations remain to be performed), then the comparison of values
must also be made when property is acquired over a period of time.
If the article is interpreted to include transactions in which
payments are made over a period of time, the theory used to deter-
mine the time of acquisition becomes very important. Article 2341
seems to be open to two interpretations. On one hand, the article
seems to require a one-time shift in classification and to forbid the
use of vesting or pro rata. The literal language of the article in-
dicates that the key time is when the comparison of values is made.
Since the property is classified wholly as separate'or wholly as com-
munity, it cannot be prorated. 7 When the meaning of an article is
clear and unambiguous, a resort to legislative intent is not ap-
propriate;88 but even if it were appropriate, the legislature's intent
tial, not sufficient to constitute a co-mingling, and it will not warrant the designa-
tion of all such funds as community property.
Gregory v. Gregory, 223 So. 2d 238, 244 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added). In
Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947), the court found that deposits of
community funds consisting of some community earnings were inconsequential in com-
parison with deposits made by the wife of her separate funds.
86. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341, comment (b) states: "The value of the community
things at the time of acquisition should be used for determining whether it is 'inconse-
quential' in comparison with the value of the separate things used." (Emphasis added).
87. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341.
88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.
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might be supportive of this interpretation. Since the legislature
specifically required the application of pro rata in article 234489 but
omitted any mention of it in article 2341, perhaps the legislature
disapproved of pro rata in commingling situations covered by article
2341. Furthermore, a strong preference in favor of the community
exists throughout the Code articles on matrimonial regimes."0 Article
2341's shifting classification is consistent with other Code articles
because it favors the community. 9
A different analysis of the legislature's intent is also possible.
Because the use of vesting and pro rata theories in article 2341 is
not expressly forbidden, by implication their use could continue. The
legislature specifically approved of pro rata in article 2344,2 so the
legislature does not necessarily disapprove its application in other
areas. Finally, the legislature may have assumed that the courts
would understand that pro rata was to be allowed in classifying prop-
erty under article 2341. Pro rata was a jurisprudential creation used
to avoid inequitable dispositions"3 that resulted from other theories.
Surely the legislature did not intend to return to unjust dispositions.
The legislature probably intended to permit the courts to continue
using theories that would result in an equitable classification of pro-
perty. If so, then article 2341 would require an inception of title ap-
proach where the acquisition is begun and completed in virtually the
same transaction, while still allowing for the application of other
theories where the acquisition takes place over a period of time."
Regardless of which theory is applied, however, article 2341
presents another question. It requires a comparison of values of prop-
erty used to acquire new property in order to determine if the value
of the community things used is inconsequential.95 Inherent in this
determination is the problem of assessing those values. In the pur-
chase of incorporeal movables, a difference in the contract price and
the market price frequently exists. For example, in speculative
stocks and in the commodities markets, prices may fluctuate con-
89. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344.
90. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2337-2342. Civil Code article 2340 particularly is
relevant.
91. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341.
92. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344.
93. See. e.g., Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); T.L. James & Co., Inc. v.
Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). Con-
tra, Hall v. Hall, 349 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (Samuel, J., concurring).
94. This analysis also may be applicable to article 2341's companion clause on com-
mingling in article 2338. The effect of the companion clause seems to be an automatic
classification of property as community property when the value of the community
things given is consequential.
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341.
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siderably during the course of one day. Use of the contract price
would be more practical in valuing the things given, but the con-
tract may not always specify the individual values of the community
and separate things used. Where it does not, the market price may
be the only alternative. Where both the community and the separate
things used are not susceptible of precise valuation, the court will
have to use its own discretion.
Once the values of the things given have been fixed, determin-
ing what is "inconsequential" often presents a problem." The courts
probably will not fix a percentage of the total value as the definition
of inconsequential, although they probably will consider percentages
in arriving at their decisions. The courts probably will handle this
question on a case by case basis, as they apparently have been doing
in other commingling cases.
Classifying Property Acquired Through Effort, Skil4 or In-
dustry
The question of which theory to use arises yet another time in
article 2338.11 Article 2338 classifies as community property that
"property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through
the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse."" Apparently the
legislature intended to permit the courts to use any of the three
theories to determine the time of acquisition of property classified
under this clause of article 2338. The reference to the time of ac-
quisition is phrased broadly: "acquired during the existence of the
legal regime . . ... " Nothing in the article's language or comments
suggests that any one particular theory is either mandated or pro.
hibited. If the legislature had intended to prescribe the use of one
theory, it could have expressed that intention as it did in article
2344 where it mandated the use of pro rata."' Thus, the courts
arguably will continue to have latitude to apply pro rata to pensions,
for example, and to apply whichever theory is most appropriate to
the facts surrounding the acquisition in other cases.''
In construing the Code articles, the courts will have the freedom
to apply their choice of theories in most cases. Article 2344 requires
96. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341.
97. See note 84, supra.
98. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2338.
99. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338.
100. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2344.
101. This analysis also applies to the clause of article 2341 classifying as separate
property things that are acquired "prior to the establishment of a community property




the use of the pro rata theory in classifying damages received for
personal injuries; 2 if the damages are awarded prior to marriage,
the entire amount should be classified as the separate property of
the injured spouse, using an inception of title approach." 3 The com-
mingling clauses of articles 2341 and 2338 should be construed to re-
quire application of the inception of title theory only where the ac-
quisition is begun and completed in virtually the same transaction
and to permit the courts to apply other theories where the acquisi-
tion is made over a period of time.10'
Amendments to 1979 Legislation
A number of amendments were added to the 1979 legislation to
clarify the question of how mineral interests and revenues from
mineral interests were to be classified. These amendments do not af-
fect the classification of the property from which the minerals are
extracted; that property will still be classified as separate or com-
munity under articles 2338, 2341, 2343, or 2343.1. ' Article 2339 was
amended in 1980'" to provide that "minerals produced from or at-
tributable to a separate asset, and ... royalties ... are community
property.'0 7 Thus, article 2339 now treats both minerals and
royalties in the same fashion as fruits.' This amendment not only
permits a spouse to reserve the "minerals produced from or at-
tributable to a separate asset" but also the royalties therefrom as
his separate property.'
In 1981, article 2343 was amended10 to provide that minerals
102. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344.
103. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341.
104. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341.
105. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2338, 2341, 2343 & 2343.1.
106. 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, § 2.
107. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2339.
108. This amendment appears to have been added to clarify the legislature's intent
that royalties, like fruits, will be community property, unless reserved. The amend-
ment also expresses an approval of the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Milling
v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952). The court reasoned that
royalties "are a portion of the product of the land;" 220 La. at 780, 57 So. 2d at 682,
thus they could not be fruits under Civil Code article 551 nor under prior article 2402.
The court analogized royalties to rents and found that the royalties from a husband's
separately owned property were community property. 220 La. at 781-82, 57 So. 2d at
682-83. The 1979 legislation did not mention royalties per se. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709.
Writers questioned how royalties were to be treated under the new Code article 2339
which specifically did mention bonuses, delay rentals, and shut-in payments. See, e.g.,
Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the
1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REv. 83, 111-13 (1979).
109. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2339.
110. 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
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and royalties from community property donated to a spouse are to
be treated, like fruits, as the separate property of the donee, unless
the act of donation provides otherwise."' In the same bill passed by
the legislature, article 2343.1 was added." 2 However, the legislature
failed to provide expressly for the classification of fruits of the
separate property that is donated. Perhaps the legislature saw the
provisions of article 2343 as exceptions to the general rule in article
2339 that minerals, bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in
payments arising from separate property are to be classified as com-
munity property if no reservation is filed." 3 The legislature may
have intended that the general rule of article 2339 would apply to
separate property that is donated to the community. If so, then
those revenues would be classified as community property, unless
declared separate under the provisions of article 2339."' Because
donated separate property becomes classified as community, a logical
conclusion is that the revenues must also be classified as community
assets."5 Perhaps the legislature should add to article 2343.1 a re-
quirement of filing a declaration similar to that in article 2339.
Classification of Particular Incorporeal Movables
The classification of particular items of property involves a
three step process. The first step is to determine whether the item
is "property" within the meaning of the Code articles on matri-
monial regimes. If the thing is "property," the second step is to
determine the manner of acquisition. The third step is to determine
which theory should be used to fix the time of acquisition. This third
step involves ascertaining whether the pertinent Code article re-
quires application of a particular theory and if not, which theory will
result in a disposition that is most consistent with the Code prin-
ciples, the jurisprudence, and concepts of equity.
Definition of Property
The definition of property is not given in the Code articles on
matrimonial regimes nor in those on things in Book II of the Civil
Code. The jurisprudential definition, apparently, is that of "patri-
mony" adopted in Due v. Due: "'Property, in its broad sense,
denotes all patrimonial rights. . . . The civil law concept of
patrimony includes the total mass of existing or potential rights and
111. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343.
112. Cbmpare LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343 with LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343.1.
113. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2339.
114. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2339.
115. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2338. See notes 24-31, supra, and accompanying text.
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liabilities attached to a person for the satisfaction of his economic
needs.' "118
One issue that the Louisiana courts have not yet been called
upon to decide is whether the goodwill of a professional practice is
property, and, if so, whether it is community property if acquired
during the existence of a marriage. Other community property
states have split on the issue of whether the goodwill of a profes-
sional practice is property. California and Washington courts have
held that goodwill of a professional practice is property and that
such property is prorated upon dissolution of a marriage."' Texas
has ruled that professional goodwill is not property. "8 If faced
squarely with the issue of whether professional goodwill is property,
the Louisiana courts could find that goodwill is an "existing or
potential right . . . attached to a person for the satisfaction of his
needs," thus meeting the civilian definition of property."" On the
other hand, the courts might find tlhat professional goodwill is not
an existing or potential right. Or, the courts might analyze the issue
by first determining that goodwill is a product of the "effort, skill,
or industry"'20 of a spouse and, as such, property. This analysis actu-
ally begs the question for the language of article 2338 states that
"property acquired ... through the effort, skill, or industry of either
spouse" is community property,'' suggesting that effort, skill, and
industry may produce something other than property. The manner
of acquisition should not be considered in determining what con-
stitutes "property." 2 Alternatively, Louisiana could adopt the
reasoning of the courts in either California and Washington or
Texas. Probably the best alternative is for the courts to attempt to
define property with more precision by devising tests for dis-
tinguishing patrimonial rights from purely personal attributes.23
116. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 165 (La. 1977) (quoting 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, PRO.
PERTY, §§ 1. 27 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 1, 77 (1980)). See LA. CiV. CODE art.
2325, comment (b).
117. E.g., In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In
re Marriage of Lukons, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976): Adams, Is Professional
Goodwill Divisible Community Property?, 6 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 61. 62 (1979).
118. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Sup., Ct. 1972). See, Adams, supra note 117,
at 62.
119. See note 117 supra.
120. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (emphasis added).
122. Accord, Adams, supra note 117, at 64, 68 (discussing the California and
Washington courts' rationale for their decisions that goodwill is property and Texas'
decisions that goodwill is not property).
123. The jurisprudential definition of property is "patrimony." In Due the court
found that contingent fee contracts were property because they were "patrimonial
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The same issue of what constitutes "property" probably will
come before the Louisiana courts in cases concerning a professional
education or the right to practice a profession. Whether a right to
practice a particular profession, manifested in a professional degree
or license, can be conferred only on a person or can be conferred
upon a community as well is questionable. If the degree or license is
a property right, and if the effort, skill, or industry of one spouse
during the regime'"' is the means used to acquire the degree or
license, then it is a community asset. 5 However, the acquisition of a
degree or license may not be the acquisition of a property right. So
far, no community property state has held in a reported case that a
professional degree or license is community property.28
One proponent 7 of classifying a professional education as com-
munity property has analogized a professional education to the con-
tingency fee contracts in Due,'2 ' reasoning that both give rise to
patrimonial rights. However, part of the court's holding in Due
relied on the ability of the attorney to enforce the contingency fee
contracts.'29 The attorney there was bound to perform by his con-
tract; an attorney is not bound, however, to practice law simply
because he has a license or degree.
Determining Manner of Acquisition
After determining that an item is "property," the second
analytical step is to determine how it was acquired. Normally, this
question is not difficult, but in Reynolds v. Reynolds,'30 the court had
rights." 342 So. 2d at 165. But the court did not explain why contingent fee contracts
were patrimonial rights; the court made no attempt to distinguish between what is and
is not a right. In effect, the court substituted the word "patrimony" for the word "pro-
perty." Furthermore, the court did not explain why contingent fee contracts are "at-
tached to a person," nor whether they are "for the satisfaction of his economic needs."
Indeed, if rights are attached to a person (note the singular form) for the satisfaction
of his (again the singular form) needs, then such rights could be only separate property.
The court should devise a workable test for determining what constitutes "property."
124. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2338.
125. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338.
126. Community property states include Louisiana, Texas, California, New Mexico,
Nevada, Idaho, Arizona and Washington. But cf Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.
App. 1979) (the court in this non-community property state held that, in limited cases,
a professional education was marital property that could be divided between the
spouses upon divorce).
127. Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 39 LA.
L. REV. 1106, 1117 (1979).
128. 342 So. 2d 161.
129. 342 So. 2d at 165.
130. 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980). The issue was whether income from the wife's
separate trust was community or separate. Some income had been distributed, and
other income had accrued but had not been distributed during the marriage.
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trouble in determining whether income from a trust is to be con-
sidered property in itself or is to be considered a fruit of the property
interest in the corpus of the trust. Whether the trustee of the corpus
has sole ownership of the corpus vested in him or whether the
beneficiary of the trust also owns an interest in the corpus prior to
dissolution of the trust is determinative. If the trust instrument and
trust law are interpreted to mean that ownership of the corpus is
vested solely in the trustee, then the trust income cannot be a fruit
of the property-ie., the trust-but may be a gift to an individual
spouse. 3' Conversely, all of the income is a fruit if the corpus is owned
by the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has a property interest in the
corpus, the result is that either all of the trust income must be a
fruit'33 or the distributed income is community property and the un-
distributed income is separate property."3 The court, having split
along at least three lines of reasoning, finds no assistance in the
1979 legislation. Amendments to the 1979 legislation that would
have eliminated this classification problem failed to pass in the 1981
legislative session.'34
Determining Time of Acquisition
The third analytical step in classifying a particular item of pro-
perty is to determine the time of acquisition by using the most ap-
131. Id. at 1149-50 (Dixon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part on rehearing).
132. Id. at 1140 (Dennis, J., dissenting on original hearing); id. at 1147 (Blanche, J.,
dissenting on rehearing); id. at 1150 (Marcus, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part on rehearing). In the opinion on original hearing, the court stated that the third
circuit's position was that the "beneficiary of the trust was the owner of the corpus of
the trust." Id. at 1138. A careful reading of the third circuit's opinion, -however, shows
it only recognized the beneficiary as owner of "an interest in the trust." Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 365 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980).
Presumably, when Justices Marcus and Blanche stated they would affirm the third cir-
cuit, it was an affirmation that the beneficiary owned an interest in the property, not
the entire corpus itself. If, however, their opinions were intended to "affirm" a holding
that the corpus was wholly owned by the beneficiary, then the Reynolds decision is
split not in three ways, but four.
133. Id. at 1142 (Watson, J., for the majority on rehearing).
134. An amendment to article 2339 was proposed during the 1981 legislative ses-
sion that would have made the fruits and revenues of a trust the separate property of
the beneficiary spouse. Proposed by the House Committee on Civil Law and Pro-
cedure, the amendment was deleted from House Bill 904 when it reached the floor of
the House. Digest to H.B. 904, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981). The effect of the amendment
would have been to eliminate the issue presented in the Reynolds case because all
distributions from a trust would be the separate property of the beneficiary spouse.
Presently. if a trust is established for the benefit of the community, all the fruits
would be community property. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338. If the amendment had passed,
its effect on fruits from such a community-owned trust would have been to require
those fruits to be classified as separate.
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propriate theory, when one is not required by the legislation. A
troublesome item for Louisiana courts has been pensions, whether
public or private. Pensions are to be classified under article 2338 as
property acquired through the effort, skill, or industry of a spouse,'"I
because they are considered forms of deferred compensation, rather
than gratuities. 3 ' Pensions also may be classified under the first
clause of article 2341 as "property acquired by a spouse prior to the
establishment of a community property regime.""'37 As noted above,"7 '
the courts may apply any of the three theories to determine the
time of acquisition of property classified under these two clauses of
articles 2338 and 2341.
Where private pensions are involved, the courts have been
applying pro rata to apportion the interests in the pension rights be-
tween the community and the separate estate of the potential pen-
sioner,' and the courts probably will continue to do so under the
revision. Where the pension is granted pursuant to public employment,
however, the courts have had to deal with a possible preemption by
federal law or state statutes governing the particular pension plan
in question. In the area of federal military retirement plans, the
United States Supreme Court has found that federal statutory
language forbidding garnishment and "process of any kind" exempts
the pension benefits from community property claims. Therefore, all
of the benefits must be classified as the separate property of the
employee-pensioner. " ' Thus, the Louisiana courts must follow these
precedents when federal retirement systems are at issue. "' When
the case involves a public retirement system established by state
statute that contains similar anti-garnishment provisions, the Loui-
siana appellate courts have been inconsistent in following the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of anti-garnishment provi-
135. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
136. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 846 (Lo. 1976); Lynch v.
Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598, 599 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 295 So. 2d 809, 81.4
(1974).
137. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
138. See note 101, supra, and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local 198 v. Meyers, 488 F. Supp. 70,4
(M.D. La. 1980); T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 322 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976);
Lynch v. Lawrence. 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 809 (La.
1974) (discounting formula used to apportion).
140. E.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981) (army retirement benefits;
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (railroad retirement benefits).
141. The Louisiana Supreme Court followed McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728
(1981) in holding that Air Force retirement benefits are not co.nmunity property.
Dedon v. Dedon, 404 So. 2d 905 (La. 1981). The opinion states: "Watson, J., concurs on
the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion, but personally adheres to the views ex-
pressed in Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975)."
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sions. "2 Should the Louisiana Supreme Court find that the community
property laws were not intended to be overridden by the anti-
garnishment provisions in statutes governing state retirement
systems,4" the courts could continue to use the pro rata approach in
classifying those public pensions.
The question of which theory to apply also arises in the case of
partnership interests. The principles for classifying a partnership in-
terest do not appear to be changed by the revision, despite the addi-
tion of article 2352 which gives the right of management of a part-
nership interest exclusively to the partner spouse. " Louisiana
courts usually classify a partnership interest that is acquired prior
to marriage by applying the inception of title theory. "' Thus, if a
husband is a partner in a business prior to his marriage, his partner-
ship interest remains separate property after his marriage. Earn-
ings from the partnership would fall into the community;..8 distribu-
tions of capital, however, would remain the separate property of the
husband.' Nevertheless, if the separate funds or assets of the part-
nership are so commingled with community funds and assets as to
become incapable of being traced to their separate nature, the part-
nership interest becomes community property.' 8
When the partnership interest is acquired during marriage, the
142. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 391 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied,
396 So. 2d 883 (La. 1981) (State Firefighter's Pension and Relief Fund benefits
were separate property). But see Thrash v. Thrash, 387 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir.i,
cert. denied, 393 So. 2d 745 (La. 1980) (state teachers retirement system benefits were
community property).
143. Because the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in both Kennedy and
Thrash (see note 142, supra), the question still is open whether the Louisiana
legislature intended such anti-garnishment provisions to override community property
laws. The Hisquierdo opinion was based heavily on congressional intent; the intent of
the Louisiana legislature may well have been different when it drafted anti-
garnishment provisions. In Congress, legislators from the forty-two non-community
property states may not have considered the provisions' impact on state community
property laws. The Louisiana legislature, familiar with community property laws in
the state, may have intended that the Code articles on community property be
understood to override the statutes containing anti-garnishment provisions.
144. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2352, which only addresses the issue of who will
manage the partnership interest. It does not affect the classification of a partnership
interest.
145. See Guilott v. Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 So.
2d 68 (La. 1978).
146. Id. at 1276.
147. Id. at 1277.
148. Succession of Guercio, 359 So. 2d 996 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So.
2d 576 (La. 1978).
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court might apply an inception of title theory to classify"9 it as com-
munity property, reasoning that the acquisition took place at the
time the partnership agreement was executed. The court also might
apply pro rata in the case of a partnership interest that is acquired
partially during the community through the effort, skill, and in-
dustry of the partner spouse and partially either prior to or after
dissolution of the marriage.' Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court
hinted that it would prorate a partnership interest between the
community and the partner spouse in Due dictum."'
A final question is whether the new legislation changes the way
in which insurance is to be classified. Until the revision, life in-
surance policies had been treated as sui generis.'52 In the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision, T. L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery,53
the inception of title theory was continued as the single theory to be
used in classifying life insurance. "' The court could have prorated the
employer group insurance policy in that case between the first com-
munity, the husband, and the second community. Under former article
2402 which allowed pro rata, that insurance policy could be inter-
preted to be a form of deferred compensation.'55 Likewise, under article
2338, employer group insurance could be called property acquired as
a result of the effort, skill, or industry of a spouse.' 6 As such, it
could be classified using a pro rata, vesting, or inception of title ap-
proach. Because the legislature has not shown any intent to deviate
from the jurisprudential classification of insurance under the old
law, the courts probably will continue to employ only the inception
of title approach to classify employer group insurance policies under
the new law.
Conclusions
The new legislation changes little of the old law which concerned
the classification of property. Where there are changes, such as the
provision allowing the husband to reserve the fruits of his separate
149. This hypothetical partnership interest was not acquired with both community
and separate funds. If it were, then a comparison of values would be necessary to
classify it under articles 2338 and 2341. If the funds had been commingled, the partner-
ship interest would fall into the community. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2340.
150. See text at note 97 and note 103, supra.
151. 342 So. 2d at 166.
152. Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
153. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
154. Id. at 847.
155. Id. at 846.
156. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338.
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property, the legislature's. apparent intent was to bring the
classification articles into line with the principle of equal manage-
ment; that is, the revision seeks to give both spouses the same
privileges and obligations. The legislature has eliminated or revised
provisions that may have been justified under the old head and
master rule, but it has basically adhered to traditional classification
concepts.
Because of this intent, and because no wholesale revision of the
articles on classification was intended, the courts' freedom to apply
any of the theories on the time of acquisition should not be any
more restricted under the new law-except where the legislature
expressly mandates the use of a particular theory-than under the
old law.
Finally, since the legislature's intent was to correct inequities in
the classification articles that the elimination of the head and
master rule would have produced, there appears to have been no at-
tempt to solve other problems not connected with those inequities.
The problems that existed under the old law in classifying particular
incorporeal movables have not been resolved by the new legislation.
Because the problems are old ones, however, does not mean they do
not deserve attention. The burden thus falls-and properly so-
upon the judiciary to interpret the new legislation in light of the
underlying principles of the Code and to use wisely the latitude
granted by the legislature.
Amanda Palmer
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